Computers and routers on the Internet send each other error messages (called ICMP datagrams) to signal conditions such as network congestion or blackouts. While these datagrams are very rare, less than 0.001% of total traffic, they hold very important global information about problems and congestions elsewhere in the Net. A measurement of the flow of such error messages in our local cluster shows a very pathological distribution of inter-message times: P (∆t) ≈ 1/∆t. This scaling extends for about seven decades, and is only punctuated by extraneously periodic signals from automatons. More than a half of these error messages were themselves generated erroneously.
The decentralized and anarchich structure of the Internet has, for a long time, invited people to perform all sorts of measurements. Indeed, it has taxed and even challenged our ability to make such measurements: for instance, it's been several years since we last knew, to any accuracy, how large the Internet actually is [1, 2] . Many types of measurements have shown "anomalous" or "pathologic" statistics, meaning that the distribution of some quantity has power-law (a.k.a. Pareto or "heavy") tails . A power-law tail implies that the probability of an outlier diminishes very slowly with the size of the outlier, and hence measurements show strong irregularities. While anomalous from a classical statistics viewpoint, this is a very usual phenomenon in the natural sciences, and has been extensively studied [3, 4] ; in particular, one of the earliest examples concerns noise in communication channels [5] . As applied to the Internet, local traffic measurements at the datagram level [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] , session data [11] , webserver workloads [12, 13] , USENET thread length [14] and Web surfing patterns [15] all show these tails. There is ample evidence that these statistical pathologies do not come from intrinsic instabilities of the Net as a communications system, but rather stem from the way in which people use the Net. Power-law distributions are often regarded as prima-facie evidence of some self-organizational process, but they can also simply be a reflection of other underlying power laws. The sizes of all files on a computer follow a power-law distribution, from small files a few characters in size, to large datasets (e.g., videos) hundreds of megabytes in size. It is thus natural that, for instance, the sizes of documents retrieved from webservers reflect this underlying breadth [13] , and it's also been shown that individual surfers follow anomalous Levyflight-like surfing patterns [15] . A useful and clarifying distinction was made in [11] : the initiations of "sessions" (such as telnet or ftp) follow perfectly normal Poissonian patterns, while the individual transactions within a session (the ftpdata connections, or the TCP traffic within a given telnet session) fluctuate over many scales.
However, all such measurements of local "traffic" have built-in limitations as to how much they can fluctuate. Indeed examination of the data shows a fairly complicated picture: the bulk of the traffic is not "self-similar" or pathological; only some tails show power-law scaling over a limited range. See Figure 1 . Even a moderate amount of scaling behaviour can certainly create a lot of trouble for engineers (who have to design equipment to handle such contingencies); but it is not pervasive enough, nor is it defined over a large enough range, to qualify as "self-similar" behaviour in the sense in which it is usually used in the natural sciences. We could say that we are trying to make a measurement of precipitation during a storm: it will probably fluctuate and be gutsy, but in its bulk be statistically regular.
We will do something different here: we will not focus on what we can measure on a storm locally, but rather try to listen for echos of storms elsewhere. We will do so by focusing on a negligible portion of the local traffic: the ICMP error messages. These are packets that computers or routers send to each other on the internet to signal all sorts of traffic problems: "speak slower, you're breaking up" or "you can't get there from here" or "this bridge is backed up", etc. ICMP error messages are generated only when packets are "dropped", i.e., typically during congestions or blackouts, or simply to signal that a certain "place" does not exist and hence you can't get there. They are, thus, an indication of a deluge elsewhere, the locally received sound of faraway storms [16] .
We measure ICMP error datagrams exchanged between our cluster and the outside of Rockefeller University. Error messages are rather rare, and hence it takes a very long time to accumulate a reasonable amount of events: our measurement accumulated 11118 datagrams in a span of 29 days. A histogram of packet inter-arrival times (∆t i = t i+1 − t i ) shows a distribution P (∆t) ≈ 1/∆t; the scaling holds for about 7 decades, from 0.3 milliseconds to an hour: see Figure 2 . It is only punctuated by what appear as "Dirac deltas": bursts with high periodicity embedded within the stream of error messages. These bursts typically correspond to "repeat transmissions" of the same error message. The distribution is much broader than traffic measurements, as shown in Table 1 .
The periodics peaks observed also show, on detailed inspection, some intriguing features. The peaks are listed in Table 2 . Several peaks are exceedingly thin; for instance, the 64 seconds peak has a half-width of 1 millisecond. However, most of the events in this peak were generated by a router immediately outside We define the width of a distribution as the quotient between the 75% percentile and the 25% percentile: it thus indicates the range within which the middle half of the probability is contained. The value for a Poisson point process is log(1/4)/ log(3/4) = 4.82, and the value for a Pareto distribution (
The width is not translation invariant (as the standard deviation), but it is scale invariant; unlike the standard deviation, it is always defined. Times for the percentiles in milliseconds. the "walls" of Rockefeller, just three hops away, which explains the timing accuracy. Not all peaks are that easily explained. The 24 seconds peak also has a half-width of 1 millisecond; the 84 events within the half-width were generated by 48 different routers and leaf nodes; most of them are in excess of 18 hops away, with latencies about 500ms, and some of them are as far away as Germany, France and England; 19 of them were not on the DNS name tables. It is interesting to note that P (t) ≈ 1/t is a highly anomalous scaling, a limiting case of Pareto distributions. Not only does it lack standard deviation and mean, it is not even normalizable in the absence of both short time and long time cutoffs. In fact, it is the only power law which shows a symmetry under exchange of short and long times: both are equally divergent. Using the transformation ν = 1/t and P (t)dt = P (ν)dν, we get P (ν) = 1/ν because dν = dt/t 2 , so our measurement shows a discrete point process version of 1/f noise. Thus, the distribution of times between consecutive error messages displays a behaviour which has no free parameters at all, except for the cutoffs. No features or details of the engineering underneath are left in this background, no traces of any of the many protocols.
Recently, Huberman and Lukose [17] analysed the issue of global jamming on the internet. They were able to show that a simple game of cooperation and defection by Internet users would cause global jams, even when they used a trivial network transport model and a very simplified model of individual activity. The jams, though, have a nonpathological waiting time distribution, perhaps because the transport model used ignored the highly structured, treelike connectivity of the Internet. This connectivity structure can be shown to provide a bias towards 1/t behaviour in the kind of measurement reported here. As seen from a given computer (a "leaf node"), the jumble of routers connecting to the rest of the Internet looks pretty much like a tree, though there are a few cycles due to the return paths from routers and multiple routes to a given destination. This tree changes with time, as the structure of routing changes; but at any given time, it still looks pretty much like a tree. Counting how many routers are exactly n hops away from us, we observe the number to roughly double each hop [21] , so modeling the net as a binary tree, while a gross oversimplification, is nevertheless somewhat metrically correct; the real tree has hugely varying connectivity. If a link goes down for whatever reasons, it will take a while until nearby routers learn how to route around it. An attempt to access a host routed through this link will result in a "Destination unreachable" error message. Assuming a nonpathological distribution (links go down and up as uncorrelated processes with identical probabilities per link), attempts to randomly access the leaves generates a 1/t distribution of waiting times between error messages, see simulation output on Figure 3 .
This model is, however, not enough to explain our data. Though the basic power law is the same, the cutoffs strongly disagree. The extent of the scaling region is determined by the number of levels in the tree; in order to fit this extent to our data, the Internet should have several billion nodes. The lowest cutoff is given by the frequency at which the root node attempts to access leaves; in order to match our lower cutoff of < 1 ms, our domain would have to be attempting to access thousands of different computers per second, which is orders of magnitude wrong. The model should thus not be understood as an explanation of 1/t behaviour in our data, but rather as a basic structural bias towards power-law behaviour that the geometry imposes on the system. In a classic study, S. Bellovin [23] described a "natural computer virus": a DNS cache-corruption virus. Hosts on the Internet rely upon DNS name servers to get the address of a computer based on its name, and viceversa; DNS servers communicate with one another to get this information. In addition, DNS servers will "cache" the names they've obtained from other nameservers for a while. If this cache or a portion thereof is corrupted, then the DNS server will serve incorrect addresses, not just to hosts, but to other DNS servers, thus propagating the errors. It is highly likely that DNS is not the only Internet service that can support such self-propagating entities; there might indeed be a veritable ecosystem evolving on the backwaters of the net. Interestingly, evolutionary [19] stipulates that Source Quench messages should not be sent.
pressure on such potential beings would be to stay out of sight, since their being noticed would result in fixing of the software bug that allows them to propagate in the first place. The generic feature enabling such a state of confusion to propagate is the fact that a master server cannot determine that it is confused, and can't reply "I am or might be confused, ask someone else". Thus the server keeps speweing confusion. Quite a few services have such structure. As applied to our case, we have been measuring errors, and most of them are generated by routers, and routers pass to one another information that is deemed to be authoritative through RIP. So it would be interesting to assess whether the ICMP errors are correctly generated or are, themselves, erroneous. Table 3 shows a breakout by protocol of our data set. A fair fraction of the errors seen there should not have been sent at all; source quench datagrams, for instance, have been deprecated for a long time. The redirect messages should not have made it out of their respective local net, and the redirect host class consists exclusively of messages like "to reach host x, use x as a gateway", which are obviously nonsensical [23] . Time exceeded in transit are typically generating through erroneous routing loops [24] . But the most frequent class of errors, Destination unreachable, poses an interesting problem: since these problems are typically transient, how can one evaluate whether the datagrams were sent correctly or in error? A way out is to notice that the most frequent subclass of errors is communication administratively forbidden. This should mean the host is in a protected subnet, typically behind a firewall, a condition which is definitely not transient. We generated a list [22] of all the hosts to which an access attempt had resulted in this error in our dataset, and attempted access all over again. We got through without errors to 152 hosts out of 320 (≈ 50%), which means that these hosts were not placed behind administrative restrictions. These hosts were responsible for 2297 error datagrams out of the 3300 (≈ 70%).
Thus we can say that, in all likelihood, more than a half of our data set consists of error messages which were themselves generated erroneously, through incorrect routing. Obviously, router confusion dominates over actual physical errors. These states of confusion could last substantially longer than actual link or host downtimes, and perhaps even spread or self-organize in some fashion. This may be an underlying cause of power-law organization in the data. Let us also recall that a fundamental law of error correction circuitry design is that the error correction components are just as fallible as the rest of the circuit. Parity correction algorithms have to assume the error might very well be in the parity bit, for instance. This fundamental notion has not been implemented in communication protocols like RIP or ICMP: there is no ICMP message reading "I'm confused".
As use of the Internet continues to spread, and as research and educational institutions prepare for the Next Generation Internet and Internet2 projects, it becomes more important to understand the global, large scale dynamics of our world-wide network. We've shown that important clues to this dynamics may lie in rather insignificant fractions of the overall traffic of the Net.
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large list of webservers and (d) all hosts which appear in the routes to the previous list (i.e., the list was generated iteratively). From these raw routes we reconstruct a graph of connections, which represents a radial map of the internet centered at our cluster. The number of hosts N d at distance d from us was: 5,5,6,8,28,43,139,344,515 (distances 1 through 9).
[22] The ICMP error datagram includes both the address of the host generating the error (in the header) and the host to which the datagram spawning the error was addressed (in the trailer); we made a list of the latter ones. Cumulative probability distributions G(∆t) of packet interarrival times for four different traffic measurements: (a) 150000 packets of local traffic at our cluster, (b) one million packets of local traffic at Bellcore (c) 150000 packets of external traffic at out cluster, (d) one million packets of external traffic at Bellcore. Traces (a) and (c) were measured locally for this study; traces (b) and (d) were studied in [6, 7, 8, 9] and are publicly available [18] .
Figure 2: (a) Cumulative probability distribution G(∆t) and probability density function P (∆t) for the interarrival times of ICMP error datagrams between our cluster and the outside of the Rockefeller campus. Notice that the probability density follows P (∆t) ≈ 1/t for about 7 decades, except for sharp Dirac-δ-like peaks. (b) Probability density for a two month trace over two subnets. Figure 3 : Distribution of inter-event times in a simulation of network access errors due to down links on a binary tree. The tree had 29 levels, so there were 2 29 leaf nodes and 2 29 − 2 routers and links. At any given time 100 links are down; they stay down for an average of 10 5 iterations.
